Semi-fragile watermarks are used to detect unauthorised changes to an image, whereas tolerating allowed changes such as compression. Most semi-fragile algorithms that tolerate compression assume that because compression only removes the less visually significant data from an image, tampering with any data that would normally be removed by compression cannot affect a meaningful change to the image. Scalable compression allows a single compressed image to produce a variety of reduced resolution or reduced quality images, termed subimages, to suit the different display or bandwidth requirements of each user. However, highly scaled subimages remove a substantial fraction of the data in the original image, so the assumption used by most semi-fragile algorithms breaks down, as tampering with this data allows meaningful changes to the image content. The authors propose a scalable fragile watermarking algorithm for authentication of scalable JPEG2000 compressed images. It tolerates the loss of large amounts of image data because of resolution or quality scaling, producing no false alarms. Yet, it also protects that data from tampering, detecting even minor manipulations other than scaling, and is secure against mark transfer and collage attacks. Experimental results demonstrate this for scaling down to 1/1024th the area of the original or to 1/100th the file size. Abstract Semi-fragile watermarks are used to detect unauthorised changes to an image, while tolerating allowed changes such as compression. Most semi-fragile algorithms that tolerate compression assume that because compression only removes the less visually signicant data from an image, tampering with any data that would normally be removed by compression cannot aect a meaningful change to the image.
Introduction
In this paper we consider watermarking for image authentication when scaling (resolution and quality) must be tolerated. We assume scaling is performed using JPEG2000: a state-of-the-art scalable compression algorithm.
A common way of providing protection against image tampering is to use watermarks. 1 Fragile watermarks are designed to be damaged by any changes to an image and changes to the image can be detected and located. Fragile watermarks do not however tolerate compression and so this severely limits their application, as images in most storage and communication systems are in compressed form.
Semi-fragile watermarks are designed to be damaged by tampering but also to remain unchanged by a set of allowed operations that may include image compression. Compression tolerance is often obtained by excluding all image data which is expected to be lost during compression, from the watermarking process. Although this ensures that the watermark will be correctly recovered from an untampered compressed image, it allows an attacker to tamper freely with and data that has not contributed to the watermark. This means that semi-fragile watermarks that are compression tolerant may not always be usable for image authentication.
Scalable compression systems allow an image to be compressed once but decompressed in a variety of ways, to suit the network and display resources available to the user. Scalability is commonly in the form of resolution or quality scalability. A fragile watermark that can support these two types of scalability must remain detectable in all scaled versions of the image, but be damaged by any other change to the image. This paper presents a scalable fragile watermarking system, for use in image authentication in which JPEG2000 [7] scalable compression is used. We use the term`scalable fragile' to emphasise that only valid resolution or quality scaling operations are permitted, and so recompression is not. This allows scalable compression to be used in the distribution of an image that is otherwise intended to remain unmodied (see the motivating scenario in section 1.2). In particular, it ensures that minute tampering in the spatial domain, which necessarily involves decompression and recompression, can be easily detected. In contrast, a semi-fragile algorithm will typically permit recompression and often a variety of other operations, and thus will be much less sensitive to tampering.
Challenges of Scalable Fragile Watermarking
In scalable compression systems such as JPEG2000, scalability is achieved through the production of a base (lowest) layer, containing the data common to all versions, followed by one or more renement (higher) layers, which are decoded as necessary to produce improved versions of the image. For images, there are two main types of scalability. In resolution scalability, each additional renement layer provides higher frequency image data, permitting the display of an image with twice the horizontal resolution and twice the vertical resolution of the previous version. This allows a user to download only the image data that is necessary for the display size of their device (g. 3c). In quality scalability, each additional renement layer provides more nely quantized image data, producing an increase in visual quality. This allows a user to download the version of the image that best ts their available network bandwidth (g. 3d). Resolution and quality scalability provide the same functionality as resizing and recompression, using minimal storage overhead and only a simple transcoding operation.
The most important requirement for scalable fragile watermarking is to ensure minimal false alarms in a resolution or quality scaled image, i.e. tolerance to scaling. Most semi-fragile algorithms achieve their tolerance to rescaling through tolerance to recompression, and authentication is obtained by only protecting the least acceptable compressed image. However such techniques rely on the assumption that higher layers have negligible eect on image semantics and so tampering with data in those layers cannot aect the`meaning' of an image. This is a valid assumption when only mild compression is tolerated. In many scalable compression scenarios, scalable compression must cater for a wide range of users: those with`high-end' devices and access to high bandwidth, as well as users of`low-end' devices with small display size or bandwidth. To ensure verication succeeds for the latter type of users, the watermark must remain acceptable under severe reductions in resolution or quality. However the lowest resolution or quality layer is likely to represent only a small portion of the full image that will be accessed by the high-end users.
This may provide an opportunity to the attacker to make meaningful changes to an image without aecting the base layer, hence violating its authenticity. Figure 1a shows an authentic image, with 6 resolution and 6 quality layers. Leaving the lowest resolution layer untouched, we are able to change the text on the aeroplane (g. 1b). Leaving the lowest quality layer untouched, we are able to add a copyright notice (g. 1c). A resolution scalable fragile watermark must allow authentication at low resolutions, but should not permit arbitrary changes to higher resolutions, which frequently contain important edge information. Similarly, a quality scalable fragile watermark must not only allow authentication at the lowest quality layer, but should also protect higher quality layers.
Our Work
Scenario: Consider a company that oers an image collection online via a subscription service.
The images are scalably compressed using JPEG2000 so that subscribers may access these images at the resolution and quality that best suits their display and bandwidth preferences. The company stores a single copy of each image on the server and each subscriber uses a watermark detector to check the integrity of a received image. The images are not intended to be altered in any way other than by the scaling that is required by users. No operation other than resolution and quality scaling is permitted, and malicious tampering must be detected.
In the following we outline our main contributions that consist of: a framework for the evaluation of scalable watermarking systems used for image authentication in the scenario above, and a scalable watermarking algorithm that can be used for authentication of images in this scenario, tolerating both resolution and quality scaling.
Framework
We propose two required properties for scalable fragile watermarks:
Detectability requires that detection algorithm should be able to detect tampering in a highlyscaled image. A fragile watermark that satises detectability:
• tolerates scaling as an allowed operation
• protects the base layer from tampering.
Graceful Improvement is intended to ensure that higher resolution and quality layers are also protected by the watermark, so tampering in higher layers, and not just the base layer, must be detected. More specically, the more important a given layer is to the image, the larger the portion of the watermark that should be devoted to that layer. A fragile watermark with graceful improvement
• protects all higher layers from tampering
• protects each layer according to its contribution to the image A scalable fragile watermarking algorithm for authentication must provide the above properties against a range of attacks. Attacks include not only simple forms of tampering, but also more sophisticated attacks. In this paper we consider simple tampering in both the spatial and transform domains, as well as mark transfer, Holliman-Memon, and collage attacks (section 2.2.3). These are the most important known attacks.
Algorithm
We present a scalable fragile watermarking algorithm specically for JPEG2000 compressed images. Our algorithm satises the important properties of a scalable watermarking algorithm, detectability and graceful improvement, and is secure against sophisticated attacks. To provide detectability, features constructed from the lowest resolution and quality layers are embedded in those layers. To allow graceful improvement (and prevent the attacks of section 1. Importance of our work: Authentication guarantee for a wide range of scaling in the resolution and quality domains is a non-trivial task. The overwhelming majority of previous works focused on scalable watermarking, discussed below, have been robust watermarks. Existing compressiontolerant semi-fragile watermarks protect only the lower layer and so do not satisfy graceful improvement, provide scalability in one domain, or require the domain of scaling to be known before embedding. (More details below.) That is, no existing algorithm can provide resolution and quality scalability simultaneously. Our work gives such an algorithm and evaluates its properties using a well dened set of requirements and an evaluation framework.
Related Work
Almost all watermarks that specically consider scalability [21, 19, 1, 10, 16] are robust watermarks that are used for copyright protection. For authentication purposes, fragility is required. The only known algorithm designed for both scalability and fragility is due to Steinder et al. [18] . It allows detection in any scaled image that contains the lowest resolution layer, satisfying the detectability property. However, as its authors note, the algorithm will falsely authenticate a tampered image provided the lowest layer is unmodied.
There are semi-fragile watermarks that allow scaling. Unlike our algorithm, these permit changes such as recompression, blurring, sharpening etc. Sun et al. [20] provide an algorithm which permits resolution or quality scaling. However authentication is only for the least authenticable bit rate (LABR), which essentially describes the least acceptable scaled image, so higher resolution or quality layers may be freely manipulated. Furthermore, the user must specify the type of scaling during embedding or suer a dramatic drop in tamper sensitivity.
The closest work to our own is the semi-fragile algorithm of Schlauweg et al. [15] . It allows resolution scaling, and like our algorithm, protects all resolution layers from manipulation. It also allows quality scaling (down to a given bit-plane) but, unlike our algorithm, does not protect higher bit planes from manipulation. Also like our algorithm, Schlauweg et al. provide security against mark-transfer and Holliman-Memon style attacks. However, they state that they completely sacrice tamper localization in order to achieve this.
As noted by Meerwald and Uhl [12] , any algorithm that is robust to compression will support some degree of quality scalability. Other semi-fragile watermarking algorithms [4, 8, 11] , although not designed to allow scaling, have been designed tolerate scalable compression. However, like
Sun et al., these algorithms also take the approach of authenticating the LABR only. Thus, if the LABR is set suciently low as to allow detectability at low quality layers, higher quality layers are not protected.
Evaluation Framework
To evaluate a scalable fragile algorithm one must consider scalability, security and tamper location.
The atermarking system that we consider in this paper consist of two algorithms: an embedding algorithm, which takes an image and a secret key, and uses them to construct and insert a watermark; and a detection algorithm, which takes the secret key and a candidate image, extracts the watermark and compares it to a candidate watermark (what we expect to extract from an untampered image). The candidate image is assumed to be authentic if the extracted watermark correctly matches the candidate watermark. The bit error rate (BER) measures the fraction of extracted watermark bits that do not match their counterpart candidate watermark bits BER = mismatching extracted bits total extracted bits .
Scalability
To assess scalability, we will evaluate both detectability and graceful improvement, as dened in section 1.2, by applying scaling to a set of scalably compressed watermarked images (see section 4
for experiment details).
Detectability
For detectability, an algorithm should tolerate resolution and quality scaling and protect the base layer from tampering.
If the algorithm tolerates scaling, the BER should be zero when only valid scaling operations have been applied. If it protects the base layer from tampering, the BER of a 1-layer scaled image (containing the base layer only) should be non-zero after an attack that aects the base layer.
Graceful Improvement
For graceful improvement, an algorithm should protect all higher layers from tampering and protect each layer in proportion to its contribution to the image.
If the algorithm protects higher layers from tampering, the BER of a scaled image with one or more renement layers should be non-zero after an attack that aects those renement layers.
Determining whether each layer is protected in proportion to its contribution to the image is more complex. We determine the ideal number of watermark bits appropriate to each (resolution or quality) layer l, and compare them to the numbers of correctly extracted watermark bits in each layer.
The number of correctly extracted watermark bits l , in each layer l, is simply counted during watermark detection. The ideal number of bits in layer l is dened as
where N is the number of embedded bits, and P f , P e and P l represent the PSNR values of the full (all layers), empty (mid-grey), and l-layer images. The t between the ideal and extracted watermark bits is measured by
This is then normalised to the range [0, 1] to produce the nal graceful improvement measure G, so that a value of 1 indicates a perfect t to the ideal, while 0 indicates the worst possible t
where m is the non-empty layer that contributes least to image quality. 2 
Security
When we say that an algorithm should have non-zero BER after an attack, we do not simply mean tampering in the spatial domain but also more sophisticated attacks. We describe the attack model by which tamper detection ability is tested.
2.2.1
Attacker's Goal An attacker's aim is to alter the image so as to fool both the human receiver and the watermark detector. To constitute a successful attack, the tampered image must be meaningfully dierent from the watermarked image, be of acceptable visual quality, and produce zero BER during detection.
Attacker's Capabilities
We assume that the attacker access to one (or more) compressed watermarked images and the associated compression parameters but does not have access to either the original unwatermarked image(s) or the secret key.
Attack Strategies
The attacker may try one of several possible strategies (listed in increasing order of sophistication):
Tampering in the spatial domain
The watermarked image is decompressed and modied in the spatial domain before recompression. Because our algorithm is designed to be fragile to recompression, detection of spatial domain tampering can be tested using the recompression step alone.
Tampering in the wavelet domain
The watermark image is decoded, wavelet coecients are modied, and the image is re-encoded. This type of tampering is not explicitly evaluated, as both collage and watermark transfer attacks are applied in the wavelet domain.
Watermark transferral
The attacker attempts to copy the watermark bits from the watermarked coecients to the tampered coecients (see e.g. [9] ). The attacker must know the watermarking algorithm.
Holliman-Memon attack
The attacker exploits the blockwise independence of the watermarking algorithm to produce a counterfeit image by replacing tampered blocks with the most similar block in the same equivalence class (see [5] for details), from the valid watermarked image.
Collage attack A more sophisticated form of Holliman-Memon attack by Fridrich et al. [2] , in which the attacker replaces tampered pixels in the watermarked image with the most similar pixel at the same location from other watermarked images. The attacker must know the watermarking algorithm and have access to multiple images that use the same secret key. We apply the wavelet domain version of this attack, replacing tampered coecients (with the most similar coecient at the same index), rather than tampered pixels.
Tamper Location
In addition to tamper detection against known attacks, an authentication watermark should provide tamper location. We use tampering in the wavelet domain to alter a single pixel in the watermarked image, and show the estimated tampered region.
3 The Proposed Algorithm
Objectives
Our goal is to develop a scalable fragile watermarking algorithm, suitable for the authentication of JPEG2000 compressed images.
The watermarking algorithm should be both resolution and quality scalable, satisfying detectability and graceful improvement as described in section 2, without requiring the type of scalability to be chosen in advance. This means that scaling should be tolerated (producing minimal false alarms), that a`reasonable' number of watermark bits should be present in the lowest resolution and quality layers and that all layers should be protected, according to their contributions in perceptual quality towards the full image.
It should be otherwise fragile, detecting illicit changes to the watermarked image. In particular, the attacks described in section 2 should not result in a meaningful alteration to the watermarked image that is of acceptable visual quality without causing mismatches between candidate and extracted bits. Furthermore, the approximate locations of alterations should be deducible from the locations of the mismatched watermark bits.
Design
The watermarking algorithm consists of the algorithms Embed(I, sk, Λ) and Detect(I * , sk, Λ),
where I represents the original image, I * a potentially altered image, sk a secret key, and Λ a set of additional public parameters (sect. 3.3).
Algorithm Overview
The watermark is embedded in selected wavelet coecients, during JPEG2000 compression of the image I, directly after the quantization step. Each coecient in the image is assigned an index i which is used to generate pseudorandom numbers that are required by the watermarking algorithm. For each selected coecient v i , a watermark element u i is generated and then embedded using quantize-and-replace embedding.
Each watermark element u i consists of j i bits. First, the number of watermark bits j i is determined, according to the index i and value of the coecient v i using global and local parameters.
Then each watermark bit u i, κ is generated as described below, where 0 ≤ κ < j i
Each watermark bit carefully constructed from the image coecients, to ensure high levels of scalability and security against attack. First a pseudorandom sequence of image coecients, termed a`feature sequence', is selected. The elements of the feature sequence are then quantized.
Finally, the watermark bit is constructed using the signs and relative magnitudes of the quantized feature coecients. This allows us to maintain good tamper sensitivity at all levels of scaling.
Detection of the watermark, in a possibly modied candidate image I * , begins with the same selection, indexing and watermark generation procedures as the embedding algorithm. The number of missing bits m i , lost from each coecient v * i due to scaling, is then determined, using information from the JPEG2000 bitstream and headers. The generated watermark is adjusted to produce the candidate watermark, by marking any watermark bits constructed based on missing coecient bits as invalid. The embedded watermark is extracted by taking the j i least signicant bits, and any extracted bits which have been identied as missing are also marked as invalid. Finally, the candidate and extracted watermarks are compared. If the image is scaled, but otherwise untampered, then all valid bits of candidate watermark and their corresponding extracted bits will match. If a mismatch of even one bit occurs, then the image is regarded as tampered.
The algorithm steps are given in Figure 2 . The individual steps of the algorithms are discussed below.
3.2.1
Watermark Embedding
Select_Coefficients
Signicant wavelet coecients are selected during JPEG2000 compression of the image I, directly after the quantization step. The set of selected coecients contains all coecients in I with magnitudes greater than or equal to the threshold 2 n , where n ∈ N is a system parameter. The use of a selection threshold that is a power of two ensures that any coecient v that is not completely lost due to scaling will be selected during detection.
Embed:
Input: I, sk, Λ 
Index_Coefficients
Each coecient in the image I is assigned an index i which is used to generate the pseudorandom numbers that are required for watermark generation. Coecients are indexed using a raster scan of each subband in each component of each resolution layer, from lowest to highest. 
Embed_Watermark
Once the required watermark bits have been generated (see the following section), each j i -bit watermark element u i is embedded using quantization and replacement
where sign(v i ) = ±1 and |v i | is the absolute value of v i . This is done for all selected coecients to produce the full (i.e. not scaled) watermarked image I .
Watermark Generation

Determine_no_of_Watermark_Bits
For each coecient v i we determine the number of least signicant bits j i that should be replaced by watermark bits during embedding. A global parameter α is used to control the overall strength of the watermark.
Watermark imperceptibility is improved by using a local embedding strength proportional (Weber's Law) to the coecient magnitude. However, the magnitude of the original coecient is not known at the detector, so α i is set to 2 β , where β is the smallest non-negative integer satisfying
This formulation relies only on knowledge of the most signicant bit of the selected coecient, so even if all less signicant bits are lost during scaling, the correct value of α i can be recovered. Thus α i serves as an approximation to |v i | that is obtainable from any selected coefcient in the original image, the watermarked image and any resolution or quality scaled version thereof.
To resist high levels of quality scaling, it would be desirable to embed uniformly strongly in all coecients, however this would compromise the imperceptibility of the watermark. On the other hand, reducing the watermark strength uniformly across all coecients would compromise robustness to high levels of scaling. We use a pseudorandom number g(sk, i) → [0, 1) to reduce the watermark strength non-uniformly. This enables greater resistance to high levels of scaling for a given level of image degradation. Furthermore, since j i and α i are natural numbers, the use of a real-valued g(sk, i) allows ner control over the image degradation (via adjustments to the strength parameter α) than would otherwise be possible.
The watermark u i to be embedded in coecient v i will be j i bits in length, where
3.2.3
Watermark Bit Generation
Select_Feature_Sequence
The κth watermark bit u i,κ of u i is constructed using a feature sequence
of length η ∈ Λ, which consists of pseudorandomly selected image coecients, and provides some assurance that these coecients remain untampered.
Each feature sequence is pseudorandomly chosen to be one of two types. An intra-codeblock sequence is selected entirely from coecients in the same codeblock as the watermark bit, while an intra-resolution sequence is selected from coecients anywhere within the same resolution layer as the watermark bit.
Intra-codeblock sequences provide tamper location, as all feature coecients are in the same spatial neighbourhood. They also allow us to easily identify a quantization stepsize that will ensure excellent tamper sensitivity while maintaining robustness to scaling. However, because they are entirely from within a single spatial region, they oer no security against Holliman-Memon style attacks.
Intra-resolution sequences provide security against Holliman-Memon attacks by creating dependencies which span multiple codeblocks. However this comes at the expense of tamper location, because tampering with the sequence will be indicated at spatially disparate points. Furthermore, because the feature coecients are not from the same codeblock as the watermark bit, a coarser quantization stepsize is required to improve feature availability after quality scaling, which reduces tamper sensitivity. 3 Using a mix of both types of sequences provides security against attack, but retains good tamper sensitivity and some tamper location.
Both the sequence type (intra-codeblock or intra-resolution) and the individual feature coefcients are selected pseudorandomly based on a hash of the key sk and the Φ most signicant bit-planes of the lowest resolution layer of the image. This ensures that an attacker, who does not know the key sk, cannot compute the feature sequence that corresponds to a given watermark bit.
Furthermore, it ensures that replacement using coecients from one or more images watermarked with the same key will fail unless all images have the same hash value, thereby defeating the mark transfer and collage attacks. Note that only the Φ most signicant bit-planes of the lowest resolution layer are used to compute the hash. This allows the correct hash value to be computed from any resolution scaled image, and any quality scaled image of acceptable quality.
Quantize_Feature_Coefficients
The xth feature coecient, v i, κ, x is quantized by 2 q i, κ, x before the watermark bit is computed.
This increases feature availability under quality scaling, by ensuring that least signicant bits (which are likely to be lost during quality scaling) do not form part of the feature. 4 This is essential because correct reconstruction of a watermark bit requires that the same features used to compute the watermark bit must be available at the detector, even after some least signicant bits have been lost. Ideally, whenever a watermark bit is available at the detector (i.e. has not been lost due to scaling), the features used to compute that bit will also be available so that verication can occur. To help achieve this, the value of the quantization stepsize exponent q i, κ, x is determined dierently depending upon the sequence type.
For intra-codeblock quantization, a stepsize exponent of
is used. This exploits a guarantee of JPEG2000 codestreams that if a bit from a given bit plane in a codeblock is received, then all more signicant bit-planes in that codeblock have been received.
Thus if the κth least signicant watermark bit u i, κ is received, then all bit-planes greater than κ in the same codeblock are recoverable. This allows the maximum possible feature sensitivity at all levels of quality scaling, while still ensuring that all features are available whenever the corresponding watermark bit is available.
For intra-resolution sequences there is no similar guarantee, so a large quantization stepsize is required. A stepsize exponent of
is used, where M i, κ, x represents the maximum number of signicant bit-planes in the subband containing the feature coecient v i, κ, x that is being quantized. The parameter a controls how quickly feature sensitivity is increased as the plane κ, of the watermark bit u i, κ , decreases.
This quantization stage should also remove any bits of the feature coecient which will be altered during watermark embedding. Thus if a feature coecient v i, κ, x belongs to the set of selected coecients, and the quantization stepsize for its feature type was not suciently large to remove all j i, κ, x watermark bits, then v i, κ, x is instead quantized by 2 j i, κ, x .
Compute_Watermark_Bit
For each quantized feature coecient Q(v i, κ, x ) we construct a sign feature and a magnitude feature.
The sign feature s i, κ, x is simply the sign bit of v i, κ, x .
The magnitude feature is whether the quantized magnitude of the xth feature coecient v i, κ, x is greater than that of the preceding 5 feature coecient v i, κ, x−1 in the sequence.
The watermark bit u i, κ is formed by XORing all sign and magnitude features from its feature sequence.
This essentially establishes a pair of inequalities (one for the sign and one for the magnitude)
for each coecient in the feature sequence. The watermark bit will change in value if an odd number of these inequalities are violated. The avoids the problem that occurs with a simple XOR of all bits in the quantized feature coeicents, which generally allows tampering by ipping pairs of bits within a coecient.
Watermark Detection
When a possibly modied image I * is received, the detection algorithm Detect(I * , sk, Λ) extracts a watermark u d from I * and generates a candidate watermark u c , then compares the candidate and extracted marks. To ensure that any bits which have been aected by scaling are not included in the comparison, the number of bits missing from each coecient due to scaling are determined, and corresponding watermark bits are marked as invalid.
The procedures to select coecients, index coecients and generate candidate watermark elements are the same as those used during embedding, and are described in previous sections. After these procedures have been applied, the number of missing bits is calculated and the candidate and extracted watermark elements are produced accordingly.
Determine_no_of_Missing_Bits
We determine the number of missing bits m i for each coecient v i , in order to correctly adjust the candidate watermark. This requires the numbers M i , Z i and P i , which can easily be obtained from the JPEG2000 headers and bitstream.
The QCC or QCD marker segments contain the JPEG2000 quantization exponent E i and the number of guard bits G i , which allow us to determine 6 the maximum number of bit-planes
that can be expected from the codestream for the subband containing the received coecient v * i . If the rst Z i bitplanes of the codeblock containing v * i are all zero, these bitplanes are not explicitly encoded in the JPEG2000 bitstream. Each explicitly-encoded bitplane will be present in the bitstream as three coding passes, with the exception of the rst bitplane, for which only one coding pass is used. Thus for an unscaled image, we would receive 3(M i − Z i − 1) + 1 coding passes.
The number of received passes P i will often be less than this when quality scaling has occurred. 7 Provided only JPEG2000 resolution and/or quality scaling has occurred, the number of missing magnitude bits from the coecient v * i can be precisely determined from these values in combination with the value of v * i itself. This is done using the formula 8
Adjust_Candidate_Watermark
If enough bits of all feature coecients are present 9 that it is possible to reconstruct the quantized feature coecients (and thence the correct sign and magnitude features), then the candidate watermark bit is simply the watermark bit u * i generated from the image I * as for embedding.
If, however, the number of bits mising from any coecient v * i, κ, x in the feature sequence is suciently large as to interfere with the value of the quantized feature coecient Q(v * i, κ, x ), then generation of corresponding candidate watermark bit is compromised. In these circumstances, the candidate watermark bit is deemed invalid (denoted u c i, κ =⊥).
6 See [6] annex E, pg. 105106. 7 Ibid., annex B.9, pg. 61 The packet headers list Z i explicitly, as the`number of "insignicant" most signicant bit-planes'. P i is easily constructed from the`number of coding passes for each code-block in this packet' across all received packets.
8 Ibid., annex D, pg. 93104, by careful examination. 9 This is guaranteed to occur with intra-codeblock feature sequences, due to the design of the feature quantization stepsize, but will not necessarily occur for intra-resolution sequences.
That is, if we let V * i, κ be the feature sequence associated with the candidate watermark bit u c i, κ , then
Note that in a scaled but otherwise untampered image, either the coecient v * i, κ, x will have been completely lost (denoted v * i, κ, x ) or the quantization stepsize exponent q * i, κ, x calculated during watermark extraction will equal the one q i, κ, x used during embedding. Therefore the watermark bit will match the candidate watermark bit, provided neither is invalid.
By adjusting the candidate watermark at the detector according to the level of scaling that has actually occurred, rather than attempting to adjust the watermark at the embedding stage to allow for all levels of scaling, this algorithm is able to tolerate high levels of scaling yet remain sensitive to illicit changes in less highly-scaled images.
Extract_Watermark
The watermark extraction process is essentially the reverse of watermark embedding, with the exception that any watermark bit that is missing due to scaling is identied and deemed invalid
Thus if v * i,κ represents the κth watermark bit that would be extracted from v * i if we did not account for scaling, the extracted watermark bit is and u d i κ that is compared produces a match, we conclude that the image has not been modied. If even a single pair does not match, then we may conclude that the image has been tampered with
This strictness is possible because in a JPEG2000 scaled, but otherwise untampered image, an exact match between u d and u c is guaranteed by the following two points. If a coecient is completely lost 10 due to scaling, then it will fail the coecient selection rule (section 3.2.1) and thus no attempt will be made to extract u d i nor calculate u c i . If a coecient is partially lost, the number of bits m i that are missing will be determined, and the corresponding bits from in both the candidate and extracted watermarks will be marked as invalid, and thus not included in the comparison.
If a mismatch between u c i κ and u d i κ occurs, it must be a result of changes to either the coecient v * i and/or one or more of the associated feature coecients v * i, κ, x ∈ V * i, κ , but it is not possible to determine which coecients were changed. As a result, all these coecients are marked as suspect.
Because these coecients may be dispersed spatially across the entire image, tamper location relies on nding a concentration of suspect coecients in a given spatial region. This is discussed in more detail in section 4.3.
Parameters
The detection algorithm requires the secret key sk used in embedding, and additional parameters Λ = {n, Φ, η, a, α}. The secret key sk is used in both feature and watermark sequence generation, and its length can be chosen to suit the required level of security. The parameters Λ will be around 48 bits and can be sent using a public channel such as the image header. To demonstrate scalability and security according to the framework in section 2, we report the average BER for untampered and attacked images at all levels of scaling, in tables 1 and 2, and the average graceful improvement values G, in The algorithm tolerates scaling, with a BER of zero on an untampered image at all levels of resolution and quality scaling (No Attack, tables 1 and 2). It also protects both the base resolution and base quality layers from tampering (1 layer, tables 1 and 2), detecting spatial, mark transfer and collage attacks. Thus the algorithm satises both resolution and quality detectability.
Graceful Improvement
The algorithm not only protects the base layer but also higher layers (26 layers, tables 1 and 2), with non-zero BER after spatial, mark transfer and collage attacks. The watermark is fairly well distributed amongst the dierent image layers, relative to their contributions to perceptual quality, with graceful improvement values (table 3) reasonably close to 1, although quality graceful improvement suers from the diculty of imperceptibly embedding in the base quality layer.
This allows the detection of attacks in which only the higher layers are modied, such as those in gure 1, as shown in gures 4a4d.
Security
The algorithm is secure against all known attacks. Spatial domain, mark transfer and collage attacks were all tested explicitly and, although the BERs reported in tables 1 and 2 are averages, tampering was detected in all 200 images, for each attack, at all tested levels of resolution and quality scaling.
While not explicitly tested, security against wavelet domain tampering and Holliman-Memon attacks is also provided. The feature sensitivity and image dependence that ensure security against mark transfer attacks also ensures security against less sophisticated tampering in the wavelet domain. 12 Similarly, the block interdependence that ensures security against collage attacks also ensures security against the less sophisticated Holliman-Memon attack. and 4c show wavelet attacks on the higher resolution layers and higher quality layers, respectively, as described in section 1.1 and shown in gure 1. Figure 4e shows the same change made to the aeroplane as gure 4a, but this time using a 50 image collage attack. In each case, the attack is detected but only its approximate location can be identied.
This occurs because in order to achieve the required security, each watermark bit is computed from several coecients across dierent spatial regions of the image rather than from individual coecients or localised blocks. This sacrices tamper location, as a mismatched watermark bit Figures 5a and 5b show a single-pixel modication in the wavelet domain, with the detection result in gure 5c. If mark transfer or collage attacks are applied in a small region, the results are similar. Note that although the attack is concentrated in a very small spatial area, the precision of tamper location is poor. This is because the small spatial change causes changes to surrounding low resolution coecients, which obscure the concentration of high-resolution coecients in the tamper detection image. This problem can be eliminated by removing the low resolution tamper data from the tamper detection image 5d. However, small modications using spatial domain tampering (g. 5e) cannot be located, though they are detected (g. 5f), as the recompression step causes widespread changes to the image.
Conclusion
We have provided a resolution and quality scalable fragile watermarking algorithm for image authentication.
Unlike most semi-fragile authentication watermarks in the literature, our algorithm generates some image features using layers above the lowest authenticable bit rate. This prevents an attacker from freely modifying higher layers, which is particularly important for highly scalable images where the lowest authenticable bit rate contains only a small fraction of the data contained in the full image.
Our algorithm is robust to resolution and quality scaling. By design, it generates zero false alarms due to JPEG2000 resolution or quality scaling for otherwise untampered images and experimental results conrm this at all tested levels of scaling.
It is fragile to other alterations, including any spatial manipulations, which involve recompression of the watermarked image and collage and mark transfer attacks in the wavelet domain.
Our algorithm also provides some degree of tamper location. However, because multiple pseudorandomly selected feature coecients are associated with each watermark bit, it is dicult to locate changes precisely using this algorithm. We rely on the assumption that most malicious tampering will alter multiple pixels in a small image region, resulting in a higher concentration of watermark errors in that region relative to the more random errors in surrounding areas of the image.
A small amount of scalability has been sacriced for security. The inclusion of the Φ most signicant bit-planes of the lowest resolution layer in the hash used for feature sequence selection makes it harder for an attacker to use multiple images with the same secret key to determine tamper detection result coecient sequences. However this means that these bit-planes must all be correct before the candidate watermark will be correctly generated. Thus any quality scaling that is suciently severe to result in an incorrect bit amongst the Φ most signicant bit-planes of the lowest resolution layer will cause the algorithm to fail. This seems a reasonable sacrice, as the importance of these bit-planes to image quality is such that it is unlikely that such extreme scaling would result in an image of acceptable quality. Finally, because the value of Φ is a parameter of the system, it is possible to adjust the balance between security and scalability by choosing an appropriate value for Φ.
The main concept behind our algorithm is that it is not necessary to treat loss due to scaling as if it were noise, because the locations of the lost bits can be precisely identied at the detector. Thus, rather than restricting the embedding region to a specic level of scaling, it is possible to embed a watermark to protect the full image and then generate an appropriately reduced candidate watermark during detection if scaling has occurred. This concept is not specic to authentication watermarking and, with appropriate error correction measures, might also be adapted to applications such as message embedding.
